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Poverty, economic inequality, class, and distributional justice are
issues embedded in our constitutional history.  They have animated
important developments in our constitutional understandings and
hold deep, though frequently unacknowledged, significance for
constitutional theory and doctrine.  Historically, considerations of
poverty, inequality, and class played a substantial role in the fram-
ing of the 1787 Constitution and the adoption of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments following the Civil War.1  During the Great
Depression and the New Deal, they sparked the constitutional
transformation that accompanied the radical re-conceptualization
of national power and public responsibility for the material security
of citizens;2 a generation later, they figured prominently in the
“due process revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s.3  Conceptually,
the continued existence of an impoverished class of citizens, politi-
cally marginalized, physically segregated, and socially isolated,
stands in sharp tension with the core principle of equal citizenship
and poses a direct challenge to basic assumptions underlying im-
portant areas of constitutional theory and doctrine.4
The relevance of poverty, economic inequality, and class to a
constitutional law course dealing with individual rights ought to be
* Professor of Law and Director, Economic Justice Project, City University of
New York School of Law.  The author thanks Helen Hershkoff for valuable com-
ments on an earlier draft.  Paul Keefe provided able research assistance.
1. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY
33-34 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of
Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 38-39 (1990); Pope McCorkle,
The Historian as Intellectual: Charles Beard and the Constitution Reconsidered, 28 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 314, 318-319 (1984).
2. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004).
3. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 33-34
(1985) (discussing Goldberg v. Kelly as the origin of the “due process revolution”).
4. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977) (identify-
ing “equal citizenship,” including the “dignity of full membership in the society,” as a
core value of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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readily apparent.  Due process, equal protection, and the First
Amendment—to take three prominent examples—provide fertile
ground for exploring the significance of poverty to constitutional
theory and doctrine.  Less obvious, though, is how and whether
these issues might be taught through a constitutional course on
structure, separation of powers, and federalism.  This Article ex-
plores some opportunities for integrating poverty-law issues into a
structural constitutional law course and offers an argument for why
such integration is desirable.  Part II canvasses various understand-
ings of the term “poverty law,” briefly recounts the apparent disap-
pearance of poverty-law issues from the law-school constitutional
canon—as well as from the agenda of liberal constitutional theo-
rists—and argues for renewed attention and re-integration.  Part
III discusses the overarching significance of poverty and economic
inequality to constitutional theory and doctrine and recommends
specific topics and cases from the standard structural constitutional
law curriculum that offer opportunities for raising and developing
poverty-law issues.  The Article closes with a brief conclusion.
II.
As the Symposium5 asks us to address the role of “poverty law”
in the law school curriculum, it seems appropriate to reflect for a
moment on the provenance and meaning of that term.  Though ef-
forts to address the distinct legal needs of poor people date back to
the nineteenth century,6 it was only in the 1960s that the phrase
“poverty law” came into widespread use.  The term now carries an
array of overlapping meanings.  In a fundamental sense, poverty
law refers to the new form of legal practice that emerged during
the “War on Poverty” of the 1960s,7 a form of practice that tran-
scended the traditional legal-aid model of providing individual rep-
resentation in unconnected and usually private-law matters, and
5. Symposium, What Is the Place of Poverty Law in the Law School Curriculum?:
Looking Back and Planning for the Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1173 (2007).
6. Starting in the late nineteenth century, legal thinkers, practitioners, and re-
formers began to analyze the distinct ways in which law affects people living in pov-
erty and urged attention to the imperative of providing reasonably effective access to
the justice system for the poor. See generally REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND
THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE
AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE LAW, WITH PARTIC-
ULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1919).
7. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVE-
MENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 270-72 (Vintage Books 1979)
(describing the “war on poverty” declared by Lyndon Johnson and the legislative pro-
gram enacted to carry it out).
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instead sought to enlist the law in a systemic effort to achieve social
and structural changes that might alleviate poverty itself.8  In a re-
lated sense, poverty law might be understood as a reference to the
substantive areas in which lawyers for the poor have carried on this
new kind of practice, areas as diverse as welfare law, family law,
housing law, consumer law, employment law, and education law9—
frequently intermixed with innovative theories of constitutional
law and administrative law—and the distinctive approaches to
those areas dictated by the needs and goals of economically dis-
tressed communities and individuals.10  As a form of practice with
transformative aspirations, poverty law might also be taken to
mean one or more of the alternative models of lawyering pursued
by some poverty lawyers that generally reject the hierarchies of the
conventional lawyer-client relationship, favor work in alliance with
social change movements, community organizations, and client
groups, and envision a more facilitative and collaborative role for
the attorney.11  From a more academic standpoint, poverty law
might be understood as encompassing the study of the underlying
8. See, e.g., E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., The Legal Services Program of the Office
of Economic Opportunity, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 847, 852 (1966) (statement by Clin-
ton Bamberger—first director of the Office of Economic Opportunity (“OEO”) Of-
fice of Legal Services—that legal services attorneys should marshal “the forces of law
and the power of lawyers in the War on Poverty to defeat the causes and effects of
poverty”); see also Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1401, 1401-03 (1995) (reviewing MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS
AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993)).
9. More recently poverty lawyers have helped spearhead the “community-based
economic development” movement. See generally Brian Glick with Matthew J. Ross-
man, Neighborhood Legal Services as House Counsel to Community-Based Efforts to
Achieve Economic Justice: The East Brooklyn Experience, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 105, 107-08 (1997).  Immigration law also became a staple of poverty law
practice, though congressional restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation in mid-
1990s curtailed this work for programs receiving federal funds. See Omnibus Consoli-
dated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(11),
110 Stat. 1321.
10. Some of the first law school textbooks on poverty law reflect these under-
standings of the term. See ARTHUR L. BERNEY ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE
POOR: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (1975); GEORGE COOPER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY ch. 1-5 (2d ed. 1973) (income maintenance, family
law and poverty, housing, racial discrimination in employment, consumer protection);
ARTHUR B. LAFRANCE ET AL., LAW AND THE POOR xvii-xix (1973) (consumer law,
welfare, housing, and litigation).  For an early and classic example of scholarship ex-
amining the distinctive impact of law on poor communities, see Jacobus tenBroek,
California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status
(Part I), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 258 (1964).
11. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a
Law School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 178-82 (2001) (discussing new forms of
poverty law practice).
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theories, structures, and evolution of social welfare programs and
policies in the United States, an assessment of the extent to which
these governmental interventions have functioned as vehicles of
progress or as instruments of subordination and control, and an
evaluation of the politics of poverty and welfare.12  More generally,
poverty law might include a critical analysis of how the law main-
tains institutions and practices that create and perpetuate severe
inequalities of wealth and economic opportunity and facilitates the
translation of those inequalities into a system of unequal political
power, privilege, and citizenship.13
Regardless of how one defines poverty law, I suspect that most
law students hear virtually nothing in their basic constitutional law
classes about the subject; or about poor people, burgeoning eco-
nomic inequality, plummeting mobility, the persistence of hunger
and homelessness in the United States, class-based distribution of
privilege and power, the political and social marginalization of peo-
ple living in poverty, state responsibility regarding any of these
phenomena, or the constitutional significance of a legal and politi-
cal system that perpetuates this order of things.  Not long ago, pov-
erty law issues held a vibrant, if not central, place in many
constitutional law classes,14 and even elite law journals routinely
featured articles examining the constitutional dimensions of
wealth, poverty, and class.15  Yet for all appearances these issues
12. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD
A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 2, 29-
31 (1993); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED
THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994).
13. See, e.g., Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of
Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 331 n.8
(2006) (listing poverty law as one of the approaches for analyzing law and economic
inequality); see also Karen L. Tokarz, Poverty, Justice, and Community Lawyering:
Interdisciplinary and Clinical Perspectives, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2006)
(discussing William Quigley’s argument that most lawyers work to preserve the
wealth and privilege of those in power by upholding an unjust legal framework, and
calling for a new approach to addressing poverty).
14. See generally LAFRANCE ET AL., supra note 10, at xvii (discussing the emer-
gence of poverty law issues in various parts of law school curricula, and noting that
“[e]ven basic subjects, such as property and constitutional law, have begun to reflect
developments concerning the law of the poor”).
15. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional
Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986); Robert H. Bork, Commentary,
The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
695; Karst, supra note 4, at 1; Frank Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Frank I. Michelman,
Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659; Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Charles A. Reich, Toward the
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have faded from the constitutional law curriculum and from active
scholarly review.  It seems that each year the major constitutional
law casebooks devote fewer pages and less attention to the consti-
tutional status of poverty and economic inequality.16
At the same time, liberal constitutional theorists have largely
abandoned the poor.  The majority view among these liberal schol-
ars now appears to be that poverty and class inequality—and their
direct and collateral impacts—lie beyond the Constitution’s cogni-
zance or concern.17  Many liberal scholars have not simply re-
nounced constitutional welfare rights as being “off-the-table” and
“off-the-wall” (and therefore not worthy of scholarly attention or
inclusion in a progressive “constitution in exile”),18 but level the
potentially more sweeping claim that “‘our constitutional tradition’
is indifferent to ‘economic inequality.’”19  Others, while acknowl-
edging the constitutional peril in permitting desperate poverty
among citizens of a “deliberative democracy,” nevertheless display
a puzzling resistance to any suggestion that the courts ought to af-
ford some meaningful protection to the economically afflicted,20
Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402, 1407 (1965); Mark Tushnet, “. . . And
Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice”—Some Notes on the Supreme Court.  1972 Term,
1974 WIS. L. REV. 177; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality and the
Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 41.
16. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 935-36 (12th ed.
2005) (less than one page discussion of wealth classifications and equal protection);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 824-25 (15th
ed. 2004) (one and one-half page discussion).  For a notable exception to this trend,
see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES
AND MATERIALS ch. 9, pp. 1593-1800 (5th ed. 2006) (full chapter devoted to “The
Constitution in the Welfare State”).
17. See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1, 3 (1999) (recounting and critiquing the majority liberal view that “the Constitu-
tion’s promise of equal citizenship addresses racial and caste inequalities but leaves
class inequalities alone,” and the more general view that class inequalities fall outside
the scope of constitutional concerns).
18. See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1732-33 (1997); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 8 (1993) (rejecting the idea that the Constitution creates any judicially
enforceable right to minimum subsistence).
19. William E. Forbath, The Constitution and the Obligation of Government to Se-
cure the Material Preconditions for a Good Society: Constitutional Welfare Rights: A
History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1825 (2001) (quot-
ing Lawrence Lessig, Colloquy, Fidelity as Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1507,
1510 (1997)).
20. See Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Wel-
fare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 731 (1997) (discussing
the poor as dispensable for liberal professors attempting to establish more moderate
credentials in a rightward trending political environment); Mark Tushnet, The
Bricoleur at the Center, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1074-75 (1993) (observing that liberal
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but optimistically suggest that the political branches ought to be
bound by constitutional norms that protect the poor.21  Still others
contribute to the trend through silence and neglect, that is, through
institutional scholarship that tacitly denies the impact of poverty,
inequality, and class on our political processes, our social relations,
and on the possibility of maintaining even a pretense of equal citi-
zenship or equality before the law.22
What accounts for these developments?  Poverty and economic
inequality—as social ills, as markers of political and democratic
failure, and as human affliction—are issues as grave and pressing
now as at any time in the last thirty years.  The United States con-
tinues to allow thirty-seven million of its people to subsist below
the federal poverty line—a standard at which even minimally de-
cent living conditions are impossible to attain in most parts of the
nation.23  Ten years after federal “welfare reform” legislation en-
ded the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (“AFDC”) pro-
constitutional theorists had abandoned a traditionally ‘left’ position, “the reduction of
severe disparities in material well-being”).
21. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 135-39.
22. See Gene Nichol, Law’s Disengaged Left, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 547, 553 (2000).
Fortunately, some prominent voices have continued to draw attention to the constitu-
tional dimensions of poverty. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH
OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED AND UNNAMED (Grosset/Putnam 1997); Ken-
neth L. Karst, Poverty and Rights: A Pre-Millenial Triptych, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399 (2002); Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in
Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997); Mark Tushnet, Social Wel-
fare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895 (2004). Cf. Martha
R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest and the Anti-Transfor-
mation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 800 (2003) (noting a renewed scholarly interest
in issues of class, though not necessarily among constitutional scholars).
23. The federal poverty line as a measure of poverty in the United States substan-
tially understates the magnitude of the problem. See, e.g., JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU,  CURRENT POPULATION REPORT: ALTERNATIVE POVERTY ESTI-
MATES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 16 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2005pubs/p60-227.pdf (“While the thresholds represent one measure of families’
needs, the official poverty measure should be interpreted as a statistical yardstick
rather than as the only description of what people and families need to live.”).  In
New York City, this poverty measure—$17,170 for a family of three—understates cost
of sustaining minimally decent housing, food, and basic necessities by a factor of al-
most three. Compare Office of the Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Annual
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 3147 (Jan. 24, 2007) (reporting
the 2007 Poverty Guideline for three person families living in the forty-eight contigu-
ous states and the District of Columbia as $17,170), with WOMEN’S CTR. FOR EDUC. &
CAREER ADVANCEMENT, THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY STANDARD FOR THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 2004, at 3, available at http://www.wceca.org/publications/NYC_Standard.pdf
(reporting the 2004 Self-Sufficiency standard for families of one adult, one
preschooler, and one school-age child as $49,874 in the Bronx and $51,567 in
Brooklyn).
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gram, the number of children submerged in deep poverty (i.e.
living below fifty percent of the poverty line) has substantially in-
creased;24 thirty-eight million people live in households without ad-
equate food; 3.5 million go homeless.25  Hard work and “playing by
the rules” still do not guarantee relief from these conditions; full-
time employment at the minimum wage leaves a family of three
well below the poverty line, low-wage workers are worse off now
than a generation ago, and the decline in economic mobility keeps
an ever greater portion of them chained to the bottom rungs of the
economic ladder.26  The United States is the wealthiest and most
powerful nation in human history, yet we lead the industrialized
world in poverty rate, in child impoverishment, in low birth weight,
and in infant mortality.27  Poverty in America has not faded as a
national tragedy of the first order even if, in some quarters, atten-
tion to it has.
Nor has the conceptual link between poverty law and constitu-
tional law weakened over the last decades.  To the contrary, ever-
widening disparities of wealth and income in the United States,28
coupled with alarming declines in economic mobility and troubling
signs of political and social ostracism of poor people,29 have inten-
sified the constitutional significance of poverty and class.  The class
structure in the United States is now more polarized and en-
trenched than at any time since the years preceding the Great
Depression.30  Economic inequality has grown to levels unprece-
24. SHARON PARROTT & ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRI-
ORITIES, TANF AT 10: PROGRAM RESULTS ARE MORE MIXED THAN OFTEN UNDER-
STOOD 4  (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/8-17-06tanf.pdf.  Only thirty-one
percent of poor children now receive federal assistance, down from sixty-two percent
before welfare reform. Id. at 5.
25. Nat’l Coal. for the Homeless, How Many People Experience Homelessness?,
NCH FACT SHEET #2, June 2006, at 2, available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/
publications/facts/How_Many.pdf.
26. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2002/2003,
at 418-19 (2003)
27. INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, UNICEF, CHILD POVERTY IN PERSPECTIVE:
AN OVERVIEW OF CHILD WELL-BEING IN RICH COUNTRIES, REPORT CARD 7, at 5
(2007).
28. See Richard L. Kaplan, Economic Inequality and the Role of Law, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 1987, 1988 (2003) (reviewing empirical data on widening economic inequality
in the United States).
29. See HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 2-8 (1995).
30. See Christopher Jencks, Our Unequal Democracy, AM. PROSPECT, June 7,
2004, at A2-A4, available at http://theamericanprospect.com/web/printfriendly-view.
ww?id=7748  (observing that the United States has not experienced current levels of
income and wealth inequality since the period between 1913 and 1929).
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dented in modern times, while the possibility of escaping the lowest
economic strata continues to fall.31  At the very least, it is no longer
plausible to suggest, as the Supreme Court did thirty years ago,
that poor people are too fluid and indistinct a group to be worthy
of constitutional attention or concern.32
Furthermore, the social and spatial segregation of the poor has
intensified together with the general level of antipathy expressed
towards people living in poverty.  The political discourse on pov-
erty and welfare—nearly always a losing proposition for those
trapped at the bottom—turned especially ugly in the years culmi-
nating in the 1996 federal “welfare reform” legislation.33  As soci-
ologist Herbert Gans wrote, by the 1990s the war on poverty had
devolved into a war on the poor, rife with scapegoating, dehuman-
izing rhetoric, and racially charged stereotyping that blamed desti-
tute women and children not only for their own plight, but for
economic stagnation, crime, and an array of other societal ills.34
31. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., DIVERGENT PATHS: ECONOMIC MOBILITY
IN THE NEW AMERICAN LABOR MARKET 110-49 (2001) (documenting a “marked de-
terioration in upward mobility,” that, the authors conclude, “threatens the meaning of
prosperity in postindustrial America”); MISHEL ET AL., supra note 26, at 418-19 (doc-
umenting an “exceptionally low” exit rate from poverty in the United States); see also
Paul E. Gabriel, An Examination of Occupational Mobility Among Full-time Workers,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2003, at 32-36, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/
2003/09/art2full.pdf (finding hardening of occupational structure throughout the 1990s
with decreases in both upward mobility for low-income workers and downward mo-
bility for high-wage occupations); Daniel P. McMurrer & Isabel V. Sawhill, Urban
Inst., Economic Mobility in the United States (Oct. 1, 1996), available at http://www.
urban.org/url.cfm?ID=406722 (analyzing existing research and noting that low-in-
come households consistently have the lowest rate of economic mobility).
32. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973)
(noting that “the class of disadvantaged ‘poor’ cannot be identified or defined in cus-
tomary equal protection terms”); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) (implic-
itly characterizing the poor as merely one of many “diverse and shifting groups”).
33. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
34. See GANS, supra note 29, at 557-59; see also Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as
We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV. 471, 475 (1997) (“On the floor of the United States
Congress, Representatives characterize welfare recipients as alligators and wolves,
made dependent by being fed.  Many state officials also subscribe to this view.  Ac-
cording to Don Boys, a former member of the Indiana House of Representatives,
‘many Welfare Mamas are, as the old-timers used to say, very “fleshy,” sucking on
cigarettes, with booze and soft drinks in the fridge, feeding their faces with fudge as
they watch the color TV.’”); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers:
How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1159, 1184 (1995) (“Attacks on welfare almost invariably concentrate on the symp-
toms of family desertion, neglected children, and illegitimacy.  Such a welfare recipi-
ent becomes ipso facto immoral and unsuitable in the minds of most people,
regardless of the rights of the needy child to receive legal assistance and protection.”).
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This socially constructed otherness of the poor is reinforced by (or
perhaps serves as justification for) the social and spatial isolation of
low-income families in economically segregated neighborhoods
and inferior public schools.35  Some commentators detect caste ele-
ments in our treatment of poor people and suggest that we have
constructed and maintain a system approaching economic
apartheid.36  One cannot easily dismiss such characterizations, es-
pecially following the government’s appalling treatment of the des-
perate families abandoned in New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina.37  In any event, the persistence of debilitating poverty suf-
fered by millions of the nation’s people who are disproportionately
minority and female, the social and geographic isolation of the
group, and the general antipathy towards and effective exclusion of
its members from the processes of self-government represent con-
stitutionally significant markers of subordination and second-class
citizenship, implicating core constitutional values and
assumptions.38
Although poverty and economic inequality continue to be salient
national issues with distinct constitutional dimensions, explanations
for the declining presence of poverty-law issues in constitutional
scholarship and teaching are not hard to conjure.  Perhaps the pri-
mary factor is the sense that the Supreme Court in the early 1970s
settled the “big issues” at the intersection of constitutional law and
poverty law (i.e., whether a right to subsistence inheres in the Con-
stitution and whether wealth constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification)39 and that the prospects for doctrinal movement are
35. See PAUL JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS AND THE
AMERICAN CITY 117-42 (1997) (documenting increased economic segregation in the
United States); see also KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZEN-
SHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 125-26 (1991) (arguing that perception of poor people
as “the Other” drives public policies aimed at “separating the poor—especially the
female and minority poor—from the rest of us”).
36. See KARST, supra note 35, at 125-26; see also CHUCK COLLINS & FELICE YES-
KEL, ECONOMIC APARTHEID IN AMERICA: A PRIMER ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND INSECURITY 43 (2005)
37. See generally THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE,
CLASS, AND HURRICANE KATRINA (Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds.,
2006); see also generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race, Scapegoating Culture,
94 CAL. L. REV. 907, 935 (2006).
38. See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 1-3 (1988).
39. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (finding no constitutional
right to subsistence); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (declining to apply
heightened scrutiny to an apparent wealth classification); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (same); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
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remote given the conservative judicial climate.  Of course, doctri-
nal stability is not in itself sufficient reason for halting scholarly
inquiry and critique, as the work of constitutional conservatives
through the 1970s and 1980s and their elaboration of a “constitu-
tion-in-exile” ultimately illustrated.40  The difference may be in the
perception that constitutional scholarship addressing poverty and
class is no longer taken seriously, is not quite respectable, or is eas-
ily dismissed as “advocacy scholarship,” and that the path to suc-
cess in academia and beyond lies elsewhere.  On the other hand, at
least some constitutional scholars have criticized the waning aca-
demic attention to the constitutional implications of wealth, pov-
erty, and class.41
Whatever one concludes about the content and direction of con-
stitutional scholarship, the argument for addressing issues of eco-
nomic inequality, poverty, and class in the constitutional
curriculum seems unanswerable.  Law schools have an obligation
to train their students not only as technical practitioners but also as
“lawyer-citizens,” many of whom will assume positions of public
power and responsibility.  A natural and indispensable venue for
this broader training is the constitutional law course.  As Jack
Balkin and Sanford Levinson have argued, teachers designing a
constitutional law course should bear in mind that “lawyers per-
form a special ‘citizenship’ role in a democracy” requiring that they
understand not only the fundamental workings and history of the
American legal system, but also its shortcomings, so that they may
“participate in and contribute to . . . discussions about . . . whether
America is in fact well served by particular aspects of its law and
whether certain radical changes might not be desirable.”42  Balkin
471 (1977) (“This Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”).
40. See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehn-
quist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 70-71 (2003) (arguing that the present political system
leaves little “room for creative advocacy directed at the courts by the liberal side,” but
that “liberal” scholarship “pushing the envelope” may be valuable on the model of
“conservative scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s” which, though considered “crazy”
or “utopian” at the time and “having only the most remote connection to what
seemed possible within the political and legal system as then contoured” later pro-
vided the blueprints for doctrinal change).
41. See Tushnet, supra note 40, at 70-71; Graber, supra note 20, at 813-18; Nichol,
supra note 22, at 547-48.
42. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 977-78 (1998); see also id. at 1004 (“[M]any law profes-
sors believe that it is their function to train lawyer-citizens as well as legal practition-
ers, especially because the United States continues to draw an excessive number of its
leaders from the ranks of professionally trained lawyers. . . . Trained in law schools to
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and Levinson note, correctly I think, that constitutional law courses
are uniquely situated to serve this function and that the standard
curriculum reflects a general orientation in that direction.43  The
principal justification for the basic constitutional law course cannot
be the preparation of students to litigate open constitutional ques-
tions, since most of the curriculum addresses decidedly settled
questions and most students will never litigate a constitutional is-
sue.  Rather, the central goal must be an education in our constitu-
tional system, its history, structure, and evolution and how it
generates, interacts with, and responds to the challenges facing the
country.
By this metric, poverty-law issues—including the treatment of
poverty as a constitutional category, state responsibility for the dis-
tribution of wealth, opportunity, and power, state obligation to see
to the material well-being of its citizens, and the impacts of poverty
and radical economic inequality on our social structures, legal sys-
tem, and political processes—all deserve a place in the constitu-
tional law curriculum.  These issues embody some of the most
pressing social, political, and moral questions of our time and
sharply pose the question of whether settled constitutional doc-
trines have served the nation and its underlying constitutional val-
ues well.  In addition, attending to questions of poverty and
economic inequality in a course on constitutional law in particular
highlights the gravity of those issues, illuminates the role of law
and legal institutions in creating or alleviating economic injustice
and distress, and may even reinforce the idea that the legal profes-
sion bears an obligation to counteract the translation of economic
inequality into inequality of citizenship and inequality before the
law.44
III.
This Part outlines some approaches for integrating issues of pov-
erty, class, and economic inequality into the introductory course on
have entirely too much faith in the Constitution and never having considered some of
its manifest imperfections—indeed, outright stupidities—our students will have few
tools with which to think about the adequacy of the institutions bequeathed to us by
our long-dead founders.”).
43. Id. at 964.
44. Given the “hegemony of constitutional law” in the minds of students and legal
academics, id. at 993, the inclusion or exclusion of poverty law issues from the consti-
tutional curriculum likely communicates a judgment about the importance of those
matters.
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constitutional structure, federalism, and separation of powers.45
On the broadest level, it is almost always possible and instructive
to examine whether the assumptions underlying constitutional the-
ory and doctrine adequately account for the social and political im-
pacts of poverty and economic inequality.  For example, a
prominent paradigm of modern constitutional theory, the “process-
based” or “representation reinforcement” approach to constitu-
tional interpretation and adjudication, is especially susceptible to
this type of analysis because it rests on an account of American
politics that ignores the overwhelming influence of unequal
wealth.46  Likewise, the central critique of judicial review—as
deviation from democratic norm—suffers from a similar vulnera-
bility because it is insensitive to whether the political processes dis-
placed by particular exercises of judicial authority actually embody
democratic practice.47  Since both the justification and the critique
of judicial review typically arise throughout the course, they pro-
vide multiple opportunities to explore the constitutional signifi-
cance of economic inequality, poverty, and class.  A second set of
opportunities to integrate poverty-law issues into a course on con-
stitutional structures arises from the role that wealth, class, pov-
erty, and social-welfare policy have played in constitutional history
and doctrinal evolution.  A third set of opportunities may be
grouped around the theme of the courts’ failure to understand or
empathize with those living at the economic margin, and the im-
pact that this judicial aloofness has had on the elaboration and ap-
plication of constitutional law.  I will address a few of these
opportunities in the order that they conventionally appear in the
standard constitutional law course—the history of the founding;
theories of constitutional interpretation; and the structural doc-
trines themselves—with the caveat that these few examples by no
means exhaust the possibilities.
45. Still other opportunities exist in those courses that emphasize individual rights,
rather than institutional arrangements.
46. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981) for the
classic exposition of the “process-based” or “representation reinforcement” theory of
constitutional judicial review.  For critiques of the theory as paying insufficient atten-
tion to matters of economic and class inequality, see, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Be-
yond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 737-40 (1985); Stephen Loffredo,
Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1331-50 (1993)
[hereinafter Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law].  For a general
critique of process-based approaches, see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Per-
sistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1980).
47. See Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69-
71 (1986).
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A. Backgrounds: Wealth Disparities and the Founding of the
U.S. Constitution
The Founding period presents a broad array of complex issues,48
one of which is the role that economic inequality and redistributive
activities by the states played in the design and adoption of the
Constitution.49  Federalists and anti-Federalists, though at odds on
the great sweep of issues, both recognized the inherent tension,
perhaps even contradiction, between a system of self-government
and the maintenance of substantial disparities of wealth amongst
the citizenry.50  For the Federalists, too much democracy, or popu-
lar control of government, threatened the privileged position of the
propertied classes; to the anti-Federalists, economic inequality
threatened the possibility of a truly self-governing republic.51  They
were, of course, both right.
Many of the framers, Madison among them, feared that “pure
democracy”—often derided as “mob rule”—would permit majori-
ties of common people to vote themselves economic equality.52
Viewed through the lens of our history of money-dominated polit-
ics, students may regard this fear as quaint and ironic.  But the con-
cern was real, as Madison’s blunt statement in the closed debates at
the constitutional convention make clear: “In future times a great
majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any
other sort of property.  These [may] combine under the influence
of their common situation; in which case the rights of property . . .
will not be secure in their hands.”53  Madison and his colleagues
perhaps had good reason to fear for the primacy of property rights
in the post-Revolutionary period.  Several state legislatures—in
tune with the strong egalitarian strain in American thought at that
time54—had enacted debt-relief provisions and measures to redis-
48. See Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution’s Bicentennial: Commemorating the
Wrong Document?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1987).
49. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution as Economic Document: Beard Revis-
ited, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 106, 106-07 (1987).
50. See, e.g., Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, supra note 46,
at 1280-81.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING 7-8 (1963).
53. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789, at 203-04 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1966).
54. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 229-243 (1991); see also id. at 232 (“Equality was . . . the most radical and most
powerful ideological force let loose in the Revolution.”).
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tribute wealth.55  Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts stood as a
sign—ominous to the framers—of insistent economic egalitarian-
ism among the populace.
Madison amplified his analysis in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, one
of the most renowned of the founding documents and widely re-
garded as a key source of the political theory underpinning the
Constitution.  It is here that Madison identified the principal threat
in any scheme of self-governance as the danger of “factions”—
groups that would use public power to advance their own interests
at the expense of the common good.56  The greatest cause of fac-
tions, Madison asserted, is disparities in wealth; such disparities
cause society to fracture into opposed groups, between which
clashes of interest are inevitable.57  In essence, Madison set out a
rudimentary theory of class conflict some seventy years before
Marx, though of course his prescription is quite different.58  For
Madison, the first object of government was the protection of prop-
erty rights, the implication being that such rights, and the unequal
distribution of wealth that they produced and maintained, must
prevail over public values and interests designated through legisla-
tive processes.59  Lest any doubt remain on that point, FEDERALIST
NO. 10 concluded by decrying redistributive legislation in the states
as “improper and wicked,” citing especially “[a] rage for paper
money, for an abolition of debts” and “for an equal distribution of
property.”60
To the anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution, the State
had every right, and perhaps even an obligation, to counteract
large disparities of wealth.61  Such divisions among citizens were
regarded as inimical to republican ideals of shared interest, civic
55. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 18-21 (2d ed. 2005) (describing redistributive legislation in the states
during the post-revolutionary period and other “excesses of democracy”); NEDELSKY,
supra note 1, at 147-49.
56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57-59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
57. Id. at 59 (“[T]he most common and durable source of factions has been the
various and unequal distribution of property.”).
58. Cf. MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION
55 (1987) (discussing the claim that Madison’s analysis in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
“anticipated a philosophy of history that is usually associated with the name of Karl
Marx”).
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 56, at 57-59.
60. Id. at 65.
61. See Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1552-53
(1988).
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virtue, and enlightened self-governance.62  Moreover, unchecked
maldistribution of property might deprive those at the bottom of
the material security thought essential to the function of a citizen.63
Later in life Madison altered his thinking and came to believe, with
Jefferson and others, that large disparities of wealth were harmful
to a republican system of government and ultimately not in the
nation’s interests.64  Jefferson suggested that the economic security
of all citizens was essential to the maintenance of democratic insti-
tutions, and the government should ensure this level of security.65
These strains in the founding illustrate that questions of eco-
nomic inequality, distributive justice, political incapacity of the
poor, and governmental authority to redress untoward divisions of
wealth have been entwined with constitutional law since the begin-
ning, a point worth making in light of the Court’s frequent failures
to account for wealth disparity and class difference in the elabora-
tion and application of constitutional doctrine.
These issues re-emerged most clearly a century and a half later
with challenges to the Social Security Act and other New Deal leg-
islation as improper redistributive measures that lay beyond the
government’s constitutional authority,66 with President Roosevelt’s
proposal of “a second Bill of Rights” guaranteeing economic secur-
ity to every citizen,67 and with the constitutional transformations
62. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 139 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981) (“A republican or free government can only exist . . . where property is pretty
evenly divided.”).
63. See WOOD, supra note 54, at 234.  Interestingly, ensuring such security would
have answered one of Madison’s concerns—that economically insecure voters would
be easily swayed—or bought.
64. See James Madison, Parties, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1792, in 14 PAPERS OF
MADISON 197 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) (stating that government should
employ “the silent operation of the laws which, without violating the rights of prop-
erty, reduce extreme wealth to a state of mediocrity and raise extreme indigence to a
state of comfort”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 138-39.
65. See WOOD, supra note 54, at 178-79 (recounting Jefferson’s proposal that the
new state of Virginia grant fifty acres of land to each man who did not possess as
much in order that all could effectively discharge the responsibilities of citizens in a
republic).
66. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (upholding old-age
pension provisions of the Social Security Act as permissible taxing and spending for
the general welfare); see also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578-83 (1937)
(upholding unemployment insurance provisions of the Social Security Act as permis-
sible taxing and spending for the general welfare).
67. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan.
11, 1944), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document
=463; see William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165,
176-84 (2001) (recounting arguments of President Franklin Roosevelt and other New
Deal proponents that “citizens had fundamental economic and social rights under the
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that accompanied the New Deal.68  Additionally, the idea—current
at the founding—that true self-governance presupposes the basic
material security of each citizen69 continued to echo two centuries
later in Goldberg v. Kelly,70 where Justice Brennan reasoned that
government had an important interest in ensuring the economic se-
curity of our poorest citizens, not only to guard against social un-
rest, but also as a means of enabling all to participate as equals in
the democratic community contemplated by the Constitution.71
B. Constitutional Theories: Wealth Disparity, Judicial
Legitimacy, and Interpretive Practices
At least since Marbury v. Madison,72 and unquestionably before
as well, commentators, politicians, courts, and the people them-
selves have debated the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review.
The classic critique holds that the practice offends basic principles
of democratic governance.  Alexander Bickel coined the term
“counter-majoritarian difficulty” to describe this perceived tension
between a power in unelected judges to negate duly enacted laws
and a constitutional system grounded in democratic principle and
majoritarian rule.73  A common question in constitutional law
casebooks asks students to consider whether Alexander Hamilton’s
formalist defense of the judicial power in THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
persuasively answers the counter-majoritarian critique.74  Hamilton
there argues that the institution of judicial review is not counter-
majoritarian at all, but necessary to ensure that transient legislative
majorities do not override the values that a supermajority of the
Constitution” and that Congress had not only the constitutional authority, but also a
“duty to exercise its power to govern economic and social life in a way that sought to
secure those rights”).
68. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 423-26 (1987) (describing the reformulation of the constitutional frame-
work during the New Deal period).
69. The idea traces back to the ancients. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOC-
RACY AND ITS CRITICS 333 (1989).
70. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
71. Id. at 265 (“Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help
bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others
to participate meaningfully in the life of the community.  At the same time, welfare
guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjusti-
fied frustration and insecurity.”).
72. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
73. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1st ed. 1962).
74. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42-45, 49-50 (5th
ed. 2005).
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people enshrined in the Constitution.75  While Hamilton’s argu-
ment might hold a neat logical appeal for some, it also strikes many
students as entirely too formal and reductionist.76
Integrating issues of class and poverty law into this discussion of
constitutional theory and the legitimacy of judicial review provides
an opportunity for students to consider the real-world assumptions
underlying the counter-majoritarian critique.  One such assump-
tion is that the political processes displaced by judicial review are
actually fair and democratic in operation.77  Even Robert Bork has
recognized that “[t]he democratic integrity of law . . . depends en-
tirely upon the degree to which its processes are legitimate.”78  The
assumption of legitimacy invites further discussion of what counts
as a legitimate political process in a democratic regime—and here
issues of class-based distribution of political power loom large.79
Once down this road, students might be asked to consider
whether the counter-majoritarian critique operates in the same
way when litigants without access to economic power, and there-
fore little access to the political process, seek assistance from the
courts.  If people living in poverty lack a democratically fair share
of political access—if the ordinary channels of civic and political
engagement are not open to them, so that courts are the only
meaningful avenue or effective point of access—then perhaps the
availability of judicial redress and the institution of judicial review
in those cases does not deviate from democratic practice at all,80
but serves as a corrective that enhances democracy.81  In a related
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 56, at 525 (arguing
that the power of judicial review does not “suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power.  It only supposes that the power of the people [as declared in the
Constitution] is superior to both”).
76. Students are usually quick to conclude that Hamilton’s argument—like Chief
Justice Marshall’s in Marbury itself—elides the question of textual ambiguity and
vastly understates the power judges exercise in interpreting the Constitution.  Few, if
any, students are convinced by the formal claim that judges striking down democrati-
cally enacted legislation are simply enforcing clear directives of “the People.”
77. See Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory—And Its Fu-
ture, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 247-48 (1981).
78. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 2 (1990); see also Balkin &
Levinson, supra note 42, at 1022-23 (“If we paid more attention to the empirical reali-
ties of American politics—an attention that is rare in any constitutional law
casebook—we might have a very different view of the so-called ‘countermajoritarian
difficulty’ as the central theoretical issue of constitutional law.”).
79. See Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, supra note 46, at
1278-90.
80. See Parker, supra note 77, at 248-51 (suggesting that there is no democratic
norm in American politics from which to deviate).
81. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 47, at 55.
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context, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that litigation
may operate as an alternative to blocked or inaccessible political
processes, noting that “under the conditions of modern govern-
ment, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances.”82
C. Supreme Court Appellate Authority and State
Court Judgments
At least since Brown v. Board of Education,83 the Supreme
Court has occupied a prominent, if uneven, role as protector of
individual rights and racial equality.  Although many commenta-
tors question the strength of the Court’s commitment to constitu-
tional norms that run contrary to popular opinion,84 no one doubts
the important structural role that appellate jurisdiction over state
court judgments has played in constitutional development.  Per-
haps less obviously, the limitations on that jurisdiction afford a key
doctrinal opportunity to explore complex questions of federalism
and social rights that invert the conventional story in which state
sovereignty acts as a foil to progressive rights.  In particular, study
of these limits on federal judicial power provides an opening to
remind students of state constitutional jurisprudence and the alter-
native space that that jurisprudence creates on issues affecting poor
people.
Many basic constitutional law casebooks focus on Justice Story’s
decision in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,85 which established the Su-
preme Court’s authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
state court judgments on questions of federal law.  The Supreme
Court later developed a corollary doctrine—the doctrine of ade-
quate and independent state grounds86—that limits this appellate
authority.87  For reasons of comity and federalism, the highest
court of each state functions as the final arbiter on questions of
82. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to
the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 38 (1993) (“Because the Court rarely disap-
points presidents on issues of immediate interest to them and their followers, it rarely
challenges the legislative programs enacted by lawmaking majorities.”).
85. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
86. See, e.g., Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a
Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 977, 977 (1985).
87. See id.
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that state’s laws.88  Hence the Supreme Court will not review a
state court judgment that rests on an adequate and independent
state-law ground, even if the state court also has ruled on federal
issues.  And since a state may afford its citizens broader rights than
those found in the Federal Constitution, a state court judgment in-
terpreting the state’s constitution as such is generally immune from
Supreme Court revision.89
The doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds thus
plays a critical role in affording states independence from the Su-
preme Court in elaborating norms of equality and social welfare.
The Federal Constitution is typically characterized—as the Rehn-
quist Court notoriously reminded us in In re DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services90—as a “charter of
negative rights” that imposes no duty on government to protect its
citizens from violence, destitution, or other hazard.91  Several state
constitutions, by contrast, impose affirmative obligations on state
government,92 recognizing social and economic rights of the type
proposed by Franklin D. Roosevelt during the New Deal and in-
corporated into international human rights treaties and modern
constitutions around the world.93  As the federal judiciary became
a less reliable guardian of individual rights beginning in the 1970s,
lawyers turned their focus to state courts and state law, and there
ensued a renaissance of sorts in the elaboration of state constitu-
tional rights,94 many involving housing, school finance, and public
88. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983) (explaining extent to
which the Supreme Court could review the state court’s decisions). But see Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 130 (2000) (reviewing state law question that was antecedent to
federal law claim).
89. See, e.g., Pollock, supra note 86, at 985.
90. 489 U.S. 189 (1983).
91. See Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 811 (2002) (noting absence of positive rights from
the Federal Constitution and discussing state constitutions as alternative source of
such rights).  By 1970, the Court had articulated its position that no right to subsis-
tence inheres in the Federal Constitution.  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486
(1970).
92. See HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR:
THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO POOR PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 3-4 (1997) (summa-
rizing state constitutional provisions involving the poor).
93. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519, 526-39 (1992) (contrasting approach to social and economic rights in the
U.S. Constitution with approaches in other modern democratic constitutions and in-
ternational covenants).
94. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490-91 (1977) (encouraging renewed attention to state
constitutional provisions as an alternative source of individual rights).
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assistance, all with special consideration of the rights of the poor.95
One can fruitfully draw on these state law cases96 to illustrate the
operation of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
while also exploring federalism as a source of progressive empow-
erment for states and individuals in the area of social welfare and
positive rights.
D. The Eleventh Amendment and Remedial Protection for
Welfare Rights
State sovereign immunity, once confined to the study of federal
jurisdiction, now appears with increasing frequency in the constitu-
tional law course.97  This development follows suit with the Rehn-
quist Court’s dramatic expansion of that immunity98 and
simultaneous restriction of Congress’ authority to abrogate it
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.99  It would be diffi-
cult to overestimate the importance of the doctrine to the actual
practice of poverty law.  In addition, at least one of the founda-
tional cases—Edelman v. Jordan100—offers opportunities to bring
poverty-law issues into the class.
Plaintiffs in Edelman were poor, elderly, and disabled people
whose benefits under the federal-state Aid to Aged, Blind and Dis-
abled (“AABD”) program had been withheld by the Illinois De-
partment of Public Aid in violation of federal law.101  The lower
courts ordered Illinois officials to restore the illegally withheld fed-
eral benefits, but the Supreme Court ruled that such relief
amounted to “an award of damages against the State” and was
therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.102  The case effec-
tively overruled a half dozen recent welfare decisions by the Court
95. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1131, 1135-38 (1999).
96. For a recent example, see In re Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 435-36
(2001) (holding on state and federal constitutional grounds that New York must ex-
tend state-financed Medicaid coverage to certain immigrants excluded from the fed-
eral Medicaid program by federal “welfare reform” legislation).
97. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 222-58 (Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005); WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 256-69 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 12th ed. 2005);
STONE ET AL., supra note 74, at 310-12.
98. See, e.g., Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,
769 (2002); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
99. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 371 (2001).
100. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
101. Id. at 653-57.
102. Id. at 668-69.
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which had upheld the retroactive award of public assistance.  Doc-
trinally, Edelman refined the contours of the prospective relief/ret-
rospective relief dichotomy applicable to Ex parte Young suits,103
and established that the federal courts would find state “waiver” of
Eleventh Amendment immunity “only where stated ‘by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implications.’”104  Both
branches of the ruling are worth discussion.
First, the Court’s characterization of plaintiffs’ claims for relief
provides an illustration of how the construction and application of
formal legal categories often ignore the material realities con-
fronting people living in poverty.  The line drawn by the Court for
Ex parte Young suits distinguishes “retrospective relief”—said to
serve compensatory and deterrence interests insufficient to over-
come the Eleventh Amendment—from “prospective” relief requir-
ing “state officials to conform their conduct to the requirements of
federal law”—permitted as necessary to vindicate federal
supremacy interests.105  In Edelman, the Court reflexively equated
benefit restoration with a prohibited “retrospective” damage
award.  In the context of a suit for illegally withheld subsistence
payments, though, the restoration remedy might more aptly be
viewed as relief from a continuing subversion of federal anti-pov-
erty policy rather than as mere compensation for past harm.  The
Court’s contrary conclusion is strangely at odds with its own insight
in Goldberg v. Kelly106—that the circumstances of a destitute per-
son denied relief become immediately desperate107—since it is
hard to imagine how the mere passage of time would erase the
economic echoes of such profound deprivation.108  When I have
103. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  The doctrine of Ex parte Young permits private suits
against state officials in federal court for prospective relief on a federal law claim,
even though the Eleventh Amendment and allied state sovereign immunity principles
ordinarily bar such suits against states and state agencies.
104. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673.
105. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1985).
106. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
107. Id. at 264 (“[T]he crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient
of the very means by which to live while he waits.  Since he lacks independent re-
sources, his situation becomes immediately desperate.”).
108. Ironically, the Edelman Court acknowledged in passing that the State’s failure
to restore illegally withheld disability payments might defeat an ongoing federal pol-
icy of relieving the needs of the poor, but dismissed that insight with an uninformed
assumption that as time passes, an award of retrospective relief would serve only a
compensatory function. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666 (“The second federal policy
which might arguably be furthered by retroactive payments is the fundamental goal of
congressional welfare legislation—the satisfaction of the ascertained needs of impov-
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asked students how they suppose the Edelman plaintiffs survived
without subsistence payments and whether they might still feel the
impact of the unlawful denial of benefits months later, they have
no problem imagining that the loans owed, unpaid debts, and rent
and utility arrears accrued have likely followed these individuals
with crushing effect and continued to undermine the central fed-
eral policy of relieving their destitution; and that this might well
count as “present effects” of the Illinois agency’s violation of plain-
tiffs’ federal rights.  The Court’s failure or refusal to appreciate
such realities in Edelman stands as one example of a judicial
worldview unable to grasp the hardships faced by people in pov-
erty or unwilling to value them in the creation and application of
doctrine.
The second major issue Edelman addressed was whether the
state had waived its immunity to suit by voluntarily enlisting in the
federal AABD program and accepting federal funds on condition
that it administer the program in accordance with federal law.109
The Court rejected this suggestion of constructive waiver.110  For
the majority, it was not enough that Illinois had accepted millions
of dollars of federal AABD funds on agreement to administer the
program in accordance with federal laws, and that the Supreme
Court by this time had held that the intended beneficiaries of these
federal programs had a right to sue state officials in federal court to
enforce such laws.111  One might juxtapose the Edelman Court’s
protective stance against waiver of state immunity with Wyman v.
James112—the infamous “home visit” case—where the Court effec-
erished persons.  Federal standards are designed to ensure that those needs are equi-
tably met; and there may perhaps be cases in which the prompt payment of funds
wrongfully withheld will serve that end.  As time goes by, however, retroactive pay-
ments become compensatory rather than remedial; the coincidence between previ-
ously ascertained and existing needs becomes less clear.”) (quoting Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 1972)).
109. Edelman also provides an occasion to explain the structure of categorical
grant-in-aid programs established by the Social Security Act, often described by the
Supreme Court as “a scheme of cooperative federalism.”  415 U.S. at 689.  Though
Congress eventually replaced AABD with the federal Supplemental Security Income
Program, other important programs, including Medicaid and AFDC, shared the same
structure of joint federal-state funding with state administration in accordance with
federal law.  Even the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families block grant—which
replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program—retains some of the
structural features of the grant-in-aid programs, despite the devolutionary rhetoric
that accompanied its adoption with federal welfare reform legislation in 1996. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (2000).
110. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673-77.
111. Id. at 688-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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tively held that welfare recipients’ acceptance of subsistence pay-
ments waived their right to be secure in their homes against
warrantless searches.113
E. Federal Legislative Power: Underenforcement, Rationality
Review, and the Poor
Another topic looks at social welfare rights and equal protection
through the lens of Congress’ Section 5 power and the theory of
“underenforced” constitutional norms.  According to this theory,
developed by Lawrence Sager, the federal judiciary commonly de-
clines to enforce constitutional norms to their full extent for rea-
sons of relative institutional competence or deference to political
branches.114  When this occurs, the theory holds, the resulting judi-
cial decision ought not to be regarded as a definitive “statement
about the meaning of the constitutional norm in question.”115
Rather, the full measure of the constitutional norm—beyond the
portion the courts feel capable of enforcing—should be regarded
as binding other governmental officials.  Applied to poor people,
Sager and others argue, while the Constitution may be “thin” with
respect to judicially-enforceable welfare rights, it nevertheless im-
poses obligations on Congress and the states to take steps to assist
the poor.116
The theory of underenforced constitutional norms, while never
expressly embraced by the Court, appears in Justice Breyer’s dis-
sent in Board of Trustees v. Garrett117—the high water mark of the
Rehnquist Court’s rollback of Congress’ civil rights power.  The
113. Id.  While the “mere fact that a State participates in a program through which
the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a sys-
tem of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be
sued in the federal courts,” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (majority opinion), the mere fact
that an impoverished family accepted subsistence payments from the State was suffi-
cient to override its privacy rights.  The Wyman court held that a welfare caseworker’s
warrantless inspection of a recipient’s home did not constitute an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment, and that even if it did, the recipient’s acceptance of
welfare payments effectively waived her right to refuse such inspections. See 400 U.S.
at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  For a recent extension of Wyman to law-enforcement
searches of welfare recipients’ homes, see Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d
916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh. en banc den., 403 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2007).
114. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1220-21 (1978).
115. Id. at 1221.
116. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 411 (1993); see also Tushnet, supra note
22, at 1900-02.
117. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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Court in Garrett held that the employment discrimination provi-
sions of the Americans with Disabilities Act exceeded Congress’
civil rights authority because those provisions imposed duties on
states beyond the “minimally rational” behavior required by the
Fourteenth Amendment without a sufficient showing that the stat-
utory remedy bore a “congruence and proportionality” to a
demonstrated pattern of constitutional violations.118  In dissent,
Justice Breyer explained that the Court’s earlier determination in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,119 to apply “mere ra-
tional-basis review to disability discrimination claims” did not re-
flect a judgment about the outer limit of protection afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment to people with disabilities, but rather
rested on institutional and separation of powers considerations.120
In like manner, one might consider whether the Court’s relega-
tion of poor people’s constitutional claims to a weak form of ra-
tionality review rests on institutional and separation of powers
concerns and represents another example of an underenforced
constitutional norm.  Analytically, the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires some tangible protection for the
poor—undeniably a “politically powerless” out-group—seems sub-
stantial.121  The near absolute deference the federal judiciary af-
fords social-welfare legislation proceeds on the theory that
“‘[under] our structure of government’ courts ought to defer to the
democratic decisionmaking, especially on ordinary distributional
matters.”122  Justified this way, the Court’s poverty cases rest on
the improbable premise that poor people have fair access to the
political process, a premise at odds with the Court’s own insight
that economic inequality tends to reproduce itself in the political
sphere, displacing legitimate democratic processes and marginaliz-
ing those without the resources to play.123  Nevertheless, the Court
has never addressed the argument that the political incapacity of
poor people might warrant judicial attention, even though the
118. Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
120. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. See Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, supra note 46, at
1331-40, which develops this analysis in detail.
122. Id. at 1278.
123. See id. at 1284-85 (discussing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990)).
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marginalization of that out-group implicates concerns at the heart
of the Carolene Products paradigm.124
F. The Dormant Commerce Clause and National Community
That the Commerce Clause has anything to say about treatment
of poor people may come as a surprise to students.  Yet throughout
our history that clause has served as the constitutional tool to ad-
vance values “no less weighty than national union, community and
democratic governance, all of which have the capacity to secure
and advance human liberty.”125  Indeed a key, though largely ne-
glected, dormant commerce clause case—Edwards v. Califor-
nia126—speaks eloquently to the issues of poverty, inclusion, and
national community, and provides a window into the shifting judi-
cial understandings of poor people and the nation’s responsibility
for the economic well-being of its citizens.
Edwards arose from the catastrophic events of the Great De-
pression, when drought and economic collapse uprooted millions
of families and set waves of economic refugees on the road in
search of a way to survive.  In response, California took a variety of
measures to exclude destitute migrants from its territory, including
the enforcement of a statute that made it a crime to transport an
“indigent person” into the jurisdiction.127  The Supreme Court in-
validated the statute, holding that the Commerce Clause prohib-
ited “attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from
difficulties common to all of them by restraining the transportation
of persons and property across its borders.”128  Quoting Justice
Cardozo, the Court described the “political philosophy” and theory
underlying the Commerce Clause as one under which “the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”129
124. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938); see LOUIS
LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 108-14, 312-14 (1975) (describing the theory of the
Carolene Products case and its influence on modern constitutional doctrine).
125. Stephen Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the Do, Re, Mi”: The Commerce Clause
and State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 153 (1993)
[hereinafter Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the Do, Re, Mi”].
126. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
127. Id. at 166.
128. Id. at 173.  Poverty and the task of relieving it, the Court thought, plainly qual-
ified as matters of national scope common to all the states. Id. at 173-77.
129. Id. at 174 (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).  The Court
also regarded the California statute as objectionable on a democratic theory of consti-
tutional review. Id. (“Moreover, the indigent non-residents who are the real victims
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Edwards is worth studying for a number of reasons.  First, it
reveals the Court’s conception of poverty, poor people, and na-
tional responsibility at a critical moment in the Nation’s history.  In
defense of its statute, California offered an account of poor people
drawn from a set of stunningly negative stereotypes and argued
that the migration of such persons into the state threatened public
morality.130  On this occasion, at least, the Court would have none
of it.  Repudiating its own long-held notion that “a person . . . with-
out employment and without funds . . . constitutes a ‘moral pes-
tilence,’” the Court proclaimed that “[p]overty and immorality are
not synonymous.”131  On the question of governmental responsibil-
ity, the Court embraced the reconceived understandings of na-
tional power at the heart of the New Deal and the emergence of
the welfare state, announcing that in an “industrialized society,”
issues of poverty and economic security had become matters of na-
tional dimension and concern.132  “[T]he theory of the Elizabethan
poor laws,” the Court declared, “no longer fit the facts.”133  One
might discuss with students why the Court chose to re-evaluate
poverty and governmental responsibility at this historical juncture
and how the conceptions it articulated compare with those that ap-
pear in later eras.134
of the statute are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the
California legislature in order to obtain a change in policy.”).
130. California’s initial brief to the Court described the poor in these terms:
Underfed for many generations, they bring with them the various nutritional
diseases of the South.  Their presence here upon public relief, with their ha-
bitual unbalanced diet and consequent lowered body resistance, means a
constant threat of epidemics.  Venereal diseases and tuberculosis are com-
mon with them, and are on the increase.  The increase of rape and incest are
[sic] readily traceable to the crowded conditions in which these people are
forced to live.  Petty crime among them has featured the criminal calendars
of every community into which they have moved.
Id. at 167-68.
131. Id. at 177.
132. Id. at 174–77 (stating that “the relief of the needy has become the common
responsibility and concern of the whole nation”).
133. Id. at 174.
134. Compare, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970) (noting that
forces beyond the control of the poor account for the persistence of poverty), and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969) (de-stigmatizing public assistance re-
ceipt, noting the absence of any reason “why a mother who is seeking to make a new
life for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she
considers . . . the level of a State’s public assistance.  Surely such a mother is no less
deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take advantage
of its better educational facilities”), with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 472
(1971) (validating negative stereotypes of welfare recipients); cf. Lucy A. Williams,
Essay, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
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The Edwards case also serves as a useful reminder of the ways in
which the nation has attempted to exclude the poor from the bonds
of shared community, concern, and citizenship.135  It is a reminder
that bears more than historical significance.  In the 1990s, many
states returned to exclusionary strategies reminiscent of those in
Edwards, imposing durational residence restrictions on welfare for
the express purpose of preventing the in-migration of needy fami-
lies.136  Having studied Edwards, students quickly conclude that the
states’ avowed purpose is constitutionally impermissible under the
Commerce Clause.  Congress’ subsequent authorization of such
discrimination, through the 1996 federal welfare reform legisla-
tion,137 poses the question of whether poor people are at another
moment of special vulnerability and ostracism and if so, what
meaning that holds for the constitutional values of national unity
and equal citizenship.138
Finally, it is worth discussing the debate in Edwards over the use
of the Commerce Clause as a tool for the protection of human
rights.  Justice Douglas expressed special misgivings, stating that
“the right of persons to move freely from State to State [should]
occup[y] a more protected position in our constitutional system
than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across state
lines.”139  Justice Jackson articulated similar concerns,140 and added
that “[a]ny measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis
of property into one class free to move from state to state and an-
102 YALE L.J. 719, 724-25 n.39 (1992) (discussing the stereotyped assumptions about
poor women underlying behavior modification restrictions on welfare eligibility such
as the family cap provision upheld by Dandridge).
135. Studying Edwards can counteract the vanishing awareness of this chapter in
our history.  Many students, especially those unversed in the history or writing of the
depression era, see, e.g., JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939), express
incredulity at the treatment of the poor revealed in the case.
136. See Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the Do, Re, Mi”, supra note 125, at 148-49,
163-73.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (2000) (authorizing states to deny certain assistance to
needy families with less than twelve months’ residence in the state).  Though Con-
gress may authorize state regulations that would otherwise violate the dormant com-
merce clause, see Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946), the Supreme
Court invalidated these state welfare laws as violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 511 (1999).
138. These ideas are developed in Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the Do, Re, Mi”,
supra note 125, at 154.
139. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he migrations of a human being . . . do
not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce.  To hold that the measure of his
rights is the Commerce Clause is likely to result eventually in either distorting the
commercial law or in denaturing human rights.”).
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other class that is poverty-bound to the place where it has suffered
misfortune” is inconsistent with the concept of “national citizen-
ship” that in essence defines the national community.141  One
might relate this debate to the discomfort expressed a generation
later when the Supreme Court relied on the Commerce Clause—
not the Fourteenth Amendment—to sustain major provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.142  The misgivings are easy to under-
stand, and one might have wished for more ample interpretations
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But it would be a mistake to ig-
nore the potential of the structural alternative presented by the
Court’s reliance on the Commerce Clause.  There may be value in
anchoring protections for the poor in structural theories of national
community, much in the way that Goldberg143 appealed to the gov-
ernmental interest in securing material well-being of all citizens as
a means of constituting the community contemplated by the
Constitution.144
IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional law, perhaps more than any other branch of legal
study, speaks directly to the issue of inclusion and identity; it re-
flects who we are as a nation and as a people, who belongs to our
community, and what we owe each other as equal citizens.145  Divi-
sions of class, like those of race and gender, mark fault lines that
tear at the fabric of our constitutional system.  That issues of pov-
erty, economic inequality, and class play so invisible a role in the
conventional constitutional law course underscores the limited
claims that poor people can make on public power to improve their
condition.  Yet as Charles Reich said a generation ago, “[p]overty
is primarily a legal problem, since in a country of great wealth it is
a problem of distribution, not a problem of producing more
goods.”146  Few could disagree that the legal system sits at the vor-
tex of the political and economic structures that foreseeably per-
141. Id. at 185.
142. See, e.g., Heart of Atl. Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
143. 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
144. For further development of these ideas, see Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the
Do, Re, Mi”, supra note 125, at 199-202.
145. See generally KARST, supra note 35.
146. Reich, supra note 15, at 1407.
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petuate unconscionable levels of poverty in the United States,147
the wealthiest society human history has known.  Constitutional
law may not afford the full measure of relief needed to end poverty
and its associated indignities.148  But our students should at least be
informed of the role that law plays in perpetuating social isolation,
economic abasement, and political marginalization and be edu-
cated in ways to imagine law’s improvement.
147. Nor could one reasonably deny that the legal profession itself bears considera-
ble responsibility for maintaining this state of affairs. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, IN
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000).
148. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present
Day, 79 YALE L.J. 505, 506-07 (1970) (urging deployment of the law to attack the ills
of economic inequality and poverty, but doubting whether law is capable of providing
the identity and community that American society has largely withheld from its needi-
est members).
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